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COOPER v. OKLAHOMA
116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of Harold
Sheppard, an eighty-six year old widower, in the course of a burglary.
Cooper was linked to the crime by forensic and circumstantial evidence,
including fingerprints and possession of the victim's property. Furthermore, Cooper made inconsistent statements to police regarding his
involvement. 1
Cooper's "competence was the focus of significant attention both
3
2
before and during the trial." Under the relevant Oklahoma statute,
Cooper was presumed to be competent unless he could prove differently
by "clear and convincing evidence." 4 On five different occasions, "a
judge questioned whether Cooper had the ability to understand the
charges against him and to assist defense counsel." 5
Initially, a judge determined pretrial, based on the opinion of a
clinical psychologist employed by the state, that Cooper should be sent
to astate mental facility for treatment. After Cooper's subsequent release
from the hospital, the trial judge heard testimony from two state employed psychologists. Although the psychologists expressed differing
opinions as to whether Coope? was able to assist defense counsel in
6
preparation of his defense, the judge ordered Cooper to stand trial.
A week before the trial, defense counsel again raised the issue of
Cooper's competence. Counsel informed the court that "Cooper was
behaving oddly and refusing to communicate with him." 7 Nonetheless,
the judge declined to reconsider his earlier determination that Cooper
8
was competent to stand trial.
On the first day of trial, Cooper's "bizarre behavior" prompted the
court to look at Cooper's competency for a fourth time. Another competency hearing was held, at which the judge heard testimony from lay
witnesses, another psychologist, and Cooper himself. 9 The expert stated
that Cooper was incompetent and could not communicate effectively

I Cooperv. State, 889 P.2d 293,298-299 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
Cooper initially admitted killing Sheppard, but later recanted his story
claiming that he had never been in the home of the victim. Before the
interview was concluded, however, Cooper again changed his story.
Although he conceded that it was possible he committed the murder, he
claimed he could not remember. Id.
2 Cooperv. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373,1375 (1996).
3 Okla. Stat., tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (West 1986 & Sqpp. 1996).
Section 1175.4(B) provides, in relevant part: "The court, at the hearing
on the application [for determination of competency], shall determine,
by clear and convincing evidence, if the person is incompetent. The
person shall be presumed to be competent for the purposes of the
allocation of the burden of proof and burden of going forward with the
evidence."
4 Cooperv. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. at 1375.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. During the hearing, Cooper refused to change out of prison
overalls because, he said, the clothes he was given to wear were

with counsel, but with aggressive treatment he would probably achieve
competence within six weeks. 10 Although the trial court "voiced uncertainty," the judge stated he did not believe Cooper had demonstrated he
was incompetent by clear and convincing evidence.1 1 The trial was held,
and the jury found Cooper guilty of first-degree murder and recom12
mended punishment by death.
During the sentencing phase, testimony was given regarding
Cooper's childhood that seemed to bolster the conclusions of the experts
that Cooper was incompetent and unable to assist counsel with his
defense. At the conclusion of the testimony defense counsel moved for
a mistrial or a renewed investigation into Cooper's competence. The
court summarily dismissed these motions and sentenced Cooper to
13
death.
Cooper appealed, contending that Oklahoma's presumption of
competence, combined with its statutory requirement that a criminal
defendant establish competence by clear and convincing evidence,
placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate his right to due
process of law. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma rejected
Cooper's argument, holding that the clear and convincing "standard was
justified because the 'State has a great interest in assuring its citizens a
thorough and speedy judicial process,' and because a 'truly incompetent
criminal defendant, through his attorneys and experts, can prove incompetency with relative ease.' 14 Cooper petitioned for writ of certiorari,
challenging that Oklahoma's clear and convincing standard for determining competency violated due process. 15
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court found the Oklahoma statute,
which allowed the State to try an individual who may be more likely than
16
not incompetent, to be unconstitutional.

"burning" him. Further, Cooper talked to an imaginary spirit who, he
claimed, gave him counsel, and on the witness stand Cooper stated that
he believed that the lead defense attorney wanted to kill him. Id. at 1375
n.l.
10 Id. at 1375.
11 Id. at 1375-1376. In making his determination, the trial judge
said: "Well, I think I've used the expression ... in the past that normal
is likeus. Anybody that's not like us is not normal, so Idon't think normal
is a proper definition that we are to use with incompetence. My
shirtsleeve opinion of Mr. Cooper is that he's not normal. Now, to say
he's not competent is something else ....
I think it's going to take smarter
people than me to make a decision here. I'm going to say that I don't
believe he has carried the burden by clear and convincing evidence ofhis
incompetency and I'm going to say we are going to trial." Id. at 1376.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1375.
14 Id. at 1376 (quoting Cooperv. State, 889 P.2d at 303).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1384.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
At the outset of the opinion, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental
principle that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due
process. 17 In fact, this principle is so fundamental that a defendant's
rights must be protected "even if [he] has failed to make a timely request
for a competency determination." 8 Nonetheless, the Court has held that
a principle of"fundamental fairness" is notviolated by allowing the State
to presume that the defendant is competent and requiring him to prove his
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. 19 However, the more
likely than not standard is much different than the clear and convincing
evidence standard put forth by the State of Oklahoma.
The imposition of clear and convincing standard creates a significant possibility that the competency determination may be erroneous.
Under the rule espoused by the state of Oklahoma, it is possible that a
defendant could prove that he was more likely than not incompetent and
still be required to stand trial. An erroneous determination of this nature
could be dire because it may be impossible for the defendant to exercise
20
other rights the Supreme Court has deemed essential to a fair trial.
Although the Court conceded that the state's interest in assuring the
efficient operation of the criminal justice system was at stake, 21 it found
that this interest was clearly outweighed by the fundamental right of the
22
defendant to be tried only while competent.
23
Because Virginia adheres to the more likely than not standard,
Cooper has little practical application for capital defense attorneys in
Virginia. However, it is important to note that the competency heariyg
can play a vital role in preparing for a capital trial.

17 Id. at 1376 (citations omitted).
18 Id. at 1376 n.4 (citations omitted).
19 Id. at 1376. (citations omitted).
20 Id. at 1381-1382.
21 Id. at 1382.
22 Id. at 1381-1382. The Court also noted that the infringement on
the State's interestby an incorrect determination of competency could be
corrected in a future proceeding. Likewise, because the State can detain
an incompetent defendant for "the reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain
[competence] in the foreseeable future," the burdensome effect on the
State's interest is lIssened. Id. at 1382 (citations omitted).
23 At a competency hearing in Virginia, "the party alleging that the
defendant is incompetent shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant's incompetency." Va. Code. Ann.
§ 19.2-169.1(E).
24 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1(A).
25 1996 WL 467642 (4th Cir.(Va.)) (upholding the admission of
testimony in support of future dangerousness, even though it was based

In Virginia, a competency hearing will be ordered if the court
determines that the defendant "lacks substantial capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his own defense." 24 If counsel believes that the defendant may be unable to
adequately assist in his defense, he should consider asking for a competency hearing. However, before making such a request, defense counsel
must consider the possibility that information to be learned at the
examination could be damaging to his client, especially in light of the
Fourth Circuit's recent opinion in Payne v. Netherland.25 Likewise,
because trial court rulings are discretionary and unlikely to be overturned
without a clear showing of abuse,26 defense counsel may want to
investigate prior competency determinations of the particular judge in
his case.
Similarly, if a defendant is found incompetent, but a mental health
expert claims that the defendant could be restored to a competent state
through the use of medication, counsel should consider advising his
client to refuse such treatment. The issue of whether a defendant can
forcibly be ordered to take medication to "restore" competency has not
been definitively answered by the United States Supreme Court, but
there are indications in the case law that the answer is no. Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse staff have had recent and successful experience with
this issue, working with skilled and dedicated defense counsel. If the
issue arises, please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for
assistance in drafting arguments.
Summary and Analysis by:
C. Cooper Youell, IV

on a competency evaluation requested by the defense). See Case
Summary of Payne v. Netherland, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
Payne was tried prior to the enactment of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1,
which entities capital defendants to a mental mitigation expert. Further
evidence that Virginia courts and the Fourth Circuit will place no limits
on future dangerousness aggravating testimony derived by the
Commonwealth's experts under that statute can be found in Savino v.
Murray, 58 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996). See Case Summary of Savino v.
Murray, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
26 See Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1963)
(holding that the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a pretrial mental examination was "so arbitrary as to constitute a denial of due
process" since the defendant had established his insanity by "reliable and
uncontroverted sworn medical testimony"); Poteat v. Peyton, 270 F.
Supp. 220 (W.D. Va. 1967) (holding that the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for a mental examination would not be disturbed
unless it was clearly shown that the trial court abused its discretion).

